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FRAMING “BOMB TALK”: THE MACRO CONSEQUENCES OF THEMICROFOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL INTERACTIONIN A GOFFMANIAN NUCLEAR WORLD1
Michael R. Hill
Department of Sociology University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Abstract 
This paper, originating with issues generated in Professor Deegan’s seminar oncontemporary sociological theory at the University of Nebraska, explores the “frames” ormicrofoundations of everyday interaction and their consequences for the ultimate macrosociologicalthreat: global nuclear annihilation. The theoretical basis of this study is Erving Goffman’s Frame
Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. The adequacy and comprehensiveness ofGoffman’s major constructs are substantiated by data from the everyday world of newspapers andpopular culture. “Keys” (or transformational conventions) are pivotal in this analysis. The centralthesis of this paper holds that the keys used to transformationally restructure and “make sense of”frames in everyday, interpersonal interactions allow us to routinely ignore the high probability ofmacrosociological annihilation by keying it into less lethal frames, thereby dangerously increasingthe probability of global nuclear holocaust. The paper concludes with the hypothesis that solvingthe macrosociological threat of global genocide requires inventing a new framework of meaning forthe micro-level organization of everyday life.
PART I: INTRODUCTION 
This paper concerns “bomb talk”: the many ways we talk about our lethal andprecisely-targeted global nuclear arsenal. It is a theoretical and applied exercise based on ErvingGoffman’s insightful study, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. Most“bomb talk” is socially irresponsible to the extent that it continuously allows us to “escape” theserious and single-minded resolution of our macrosociological nuclear reality. The most dangerousfeatures of “bomb talk” lie embedded in the very rules we use to give meaning and structure tointerpersonal interaction.
By focusing on the rules for organizing and transforming meaning in everyday life, this paperaddresses our perplexing cultural preparedness for global annihilation. The thesis of this paper holdsthat the way we “frame” or engage in microfoundational talk about our lethal macro reality defeatsour efforts to find a solution to the threat of global nuclear annihilation. This is the potential horrorof life/death in a Goffmanian nuclear world. I conclude that to find a solution to thismacrosociological nightmare we must radically overhaul, if not revolutionize, the microfoundationalframework of everyday language and interpersonal social interaction. 
1 Presented to the Parsons Conference on Microfoundations of Macrosociology, Departmentof Sociology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, April 9, 1988. This paper shared first-place honors in being one of two submissions selected for presentation in this national graduatestudent paper competition. The authors of both papers were awarded honoraria from the TalcottParsons Memorial Fund.  
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As academics, we generate quite a bit of “bomb talk” ourselves, and this paper is noexception. Let me emphasize that this paper in itself is not “part of any solution.” The only genuinesolution lies in coordinated, macro-social action. We need constantly to remind ourselves thatacademic and professional “bomb talk” is no less problematic than the everyday, garden variety. 
We go to great lengths as intellectuals to “make sense of” the nuclear threat. We teach aboutit in courses, we write analytic monographs, we organize symposia. Using Goffman’s concept offrame analysis, I demonstrate that our nuclear world can be (and has been) “made sense of” in somany disparate ways (including courses, monographs, and symposia) that we are in danger of failingto effectively confront the awesome, untransformed reality of nuclear destruction. I question herewhether all our “bomb talk” in all its formats is helping in any significant way to reduce theprobability of nuclear holocaust. Indeed, the plethora of formats may be a root microfoundationalfactor in our inability to concentrate our attention on the nuclear threat and act effectively. 
Curiously, sociologists as a group have been remarkably quiet on the problem of nuclearannihilation. The most cogent analysis to-date is still C. Wright Mills’ (1960) The Causes of World
War Three. Mills calls on the world’s intellectuals to sensitize us to the macrosociological aspectsof nuclear threat. He urges recognition, study, and publication of the vested interests of politicians,military men, and munitions merchants. I conclude here, however, that the world’s cultural laborershave a much more difficult task ahead than generating more studies and symposia on another “publicissue” (Mills, 1959). 
In any event, few sociologists have responded to Mills’ call for academic mobilization.Ronald Kramer and Sam Marullo (1985) survey the recent sociological literature and find it largelybarren. They recount a content analysis by Finsterbush of the three mainline sociology journals:
American Sociological Review, American Journal of Sociology, and Social Forces. Finsterbushexamined the 6500 articles published in the years 1945 to 1984, but, Kramer and Marullo (1985:283) report, Finsterbush found only six that “deal with nuclear weapons related issues.” Unlikemany who are gravely disappointed by this low level of production, I do not call here for a crashprogram of specifically sociological studies focused on nuclear devastation per se. Workers inrelated social science disciplines, including history and political science, have written a great dealabout nuclear conflict and the history of the arms race — without discernable effect. I see no reasonto expect the standard sociological treatments to do any better. We do need to get to work, but ourlabors must take us in directions that differ dramatically from traditionally-defined sociologicalpractice. 
I argue here, paradoxically, that symposia, conferences, special panels, and papers (such asthe one now in hand) are symptomatic of a deep cultural sleep that fogs our thinking, our reflections,and our debates where globally destructive nuclear devices are concerned.  My thesis is simply this:Our microfoundational cultural apparatus appears ill-equipped, if not unable, to conceptualize orframe the present nuclear threat in a way that lets us truly come to grips with it. We keep “makingsense” of it in ways that let it slip away from us. My reasons for this dismal assessment rest on thearguments found in Erving Goffman’s (1974) analytical study of everyday life: Frame Analysis: An
Essay on the Organization of Experience. 
Goffman is well-known for his studies of the microfoundations of interpersonal interaction,but these have only recently been interpreted as having wider sociological importance. Goffman’sinfluential early work includes: Asylums; Behavior in Public Places; Encounters; Gender
Advertisements; Interaction Ritual; Presentation of Self in Everyday Life; Relations in Public;
Stigma; and Strategic Interaction. With the publication of Frame Analysis, however, Goffman’smicrofoundational analyses took a much more formal, systematic turn that informs ourunderstanding of macrosociological possibilities. Anthony Giddens now writes: 
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Goffman’s writings thus contribute much more to an understanding of‘macro-structural’ properties than Goffman supposed. (Giddens, 1987: 138).
 In this paper, I concentrate on Goffman’s analysis of the ways in which interacting persons “makesense” of their situation and activities by resorting to “frames.” It will become painfully clear thatthese techniques of “making sense,” while extraordinarily useful to everyday interactants, allow usto play disastrous “mind games” in the face of full force nuclear destruction. Drawing suchmacrosociological consequences from microfoundational analyses has been resisted by symbolicinteractionists during the last two decades. 
The apolitical tone of much microsociological analysis is, in its own way, a socialconstruction of reality — a construction whose full explication lies beyond the scope of this paper.It is helpful however, to point out that micro analysis has always had a macro political component— if one chooses to emphasize it. It is striking how few symbolic interactionists emphasize the factthat George H. Mead (1934) wrote on mind, self, and society. Much of Mead’s work and writing(and that of W.I. Thomas and Jane Addams, for that matter) focused on organized social action, andhe took part in many political activities in Chicago. For Mead, the development of “internationalmindedness” was the mark of a fully mature “self” (Mead, 1934; Deegan, 1988). 
So too with Jessie Taft (a Chicago student of G.H. Mead and W.I. Thomas). Taft concludedher doctoral dissertation on the interpersonal meaning of the women’s movement with thisobservation: 
The fundamental purpose of the woman movement, therefore, as of any greatsocial movement, is bound to be the producing of social scientists who will becapable of offering hypotheses that are based on the actual data constituting theproblems, and the bringing about of an increasing social consciousness among allpeople such that they too will become sufficiently aware of the real content of socialrelationships and be willing to undergo the adjustments of the social order necessaryto make actual the theories which promise salvation. (Taft, quoted in Deegan andHill, 1987: 46). 
Taft states the platform for sociological action. Study of micro-level human experience andsituations, and the offering of hypotheses based on these studies, calls forth social consciousness — and macro-level change. 
The widespread view of micro analysis as apolitical derives in some part from the popularand well-known work of Peter Berger, a student of phenomenologist Alfred Schutz. Berger’s workon the social construction of reality (Berger and Kellner, 1964; Berger and Luckmann, 1966) givesprimary emphasis to the individual and his/her social development. Schutz’ (1944) “stranger” is nota citizen, but a social outsider whose main concern is to learn the rules, typifications, and relevancesof a new society. Yet, buried within Schutz is a political presupposition of major importance. 
Reflecting on the multiplicity and great variety of human systems of relevance andtypifications (i.e., multiple realities), Schutz found no problem in their proliferation or coexistence,except when we are forced to accept the worldview of more powerful agents. Specifically, he said,if a person: 
. . . has the power to impose his system of relevance upon the individualstypified by him, and especially to enforce its institutionalization, then this fact willcreate various repercussions on the situation of the individuals typified against theirwill. (Schutz, 1971: 255).  
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Thus, Schutz was clearly aware of the potential for hegemonic domination and ideologicaloppression (and he wrote a thoughtful analysis of the need for the United Nations as a forum forinternational cooperation). In like vein, Goffman presupposes the possibility of ideologicalhegemony, but he is interested in a quite different and more fundamental problem: explicating the“frames” in which both oppressor and oppressed can become jointly ensnared. Goffman’s goal in
Frame Analysis is truly microfoundational, and the consequences of his findings — when appliedto the nuclear world of today — are genuinely macrosociological. 
In the introduction to Frame Analysis, Goffman (1974: 14) wrote: 
The analysis developed [here] does not catch at the differences between theadvantaged and disadvantaged classes and can be said to direct attention away fromsuch matters. I think that is true. I can only suggest that he who would combat falseconsciousness and awaken people to their true interests has much to do, because thesleep is very deep. And I do not intend here to provide a lullaby but merely to sneakin and watch the way people snore.
These words alert us that Goffman does not intend a political analysis in the usual sense.Nonetheless, his analysis is fundamentally political and filled with macrosociological consequences.He warns us that we have ways — deeply ingrained cultural practices — for “fooling ourselves,”for remaining asleep when we think we are wide awake, as, for example, when we cast an“informed” vote, listen “attentively” to a “thoughtful” lecture, or “carefully analyze” an“intellectual” debate while, in fact, remaining largely ignorant of the crucial points. These practicesare the very ones to which we, as cultural laborers, so often turn and so often offer to others as“solutions.” I submit that the present reality of nuclear annihilation is normalized by our culturalpractices such that we cannot effectively comprehend that an unprecedented, unfathomable orderof lethal magnitude confronts our world and our minds. This is a deeply political assertion forcultural laborers because it suggests that we — and the way we think as intellectuals — may be anintegral part, perhaps even a sustaining cause of “the nuclear problem.” 
Given this assertion, it is crucial to ask why have I written this paper, to ask why I have theaudacity to make yet another addition to the great pile of intellectual commentary on life in thenuclear age. I present two justifications. First, I do not think that our intellectual tools are useless,only that they are inadequately developed as things now stand. Second, I do not think that we arehelpless. The present threat was/is constructed by human architects and thus humans can — I trust—  dismantle it virtually overnight if so inclined. The point I suspect to be true and that I emphasizehere is that our present, extensive battery of cultural practices and conceptual categories results —for whatever reasons —  in situations that disable us as cultural workers when we confront thereality of nuclear annihilation. Thus, this paper is not a “call” for the end of the arms race, for suchcalls have been made repeatedly without significant effect by persons in far more powerful andinfluential positions than me. Our past efforts and standard cultural practices have everywhere failedus and I suggest that we will not succeed by doing “more of the same.” This paper is a call, however,to the intellectuals who read these comments to devise an effective way to fully and simultaneouslycomprehend the finality and the solubility of our socially-constructed nuclear predicament. 
It is, I think, difficult for those of us who have analyzed the proliferation of destructivenuclear devices to stop and question reflexively whether we are really doing anything that willeffectively remove the reality of the planned nuclear holocaust. We believe deeply in the efficacyof our studies and reports. We too have vested interests that Mills (1960) too easily forgets. It iscertainly true that research, lectures, and teach-ins, for example, often make us feel better, give usa sense of action, and help keep alive our beliefs in democracy and free speech in significant andimportant ways. I do not deny these admirable outcomes, but I do point out that these — and many
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related intellectually-rooted activities (i.e., writing books, organizing symposia, draftingmanifestoes, etc.) —  have not been effective in any demonstrable sense in reducing the escalatingprobability of nuclear annihilation on a global scale. Because you are a member of a thoughtfulaudience of readers, I hope you will reflect on the microfoundational issues raised in this paper. Ifso, I enlist your effort in what appears to me, at least, to be the foremost cultural and intellectualpuzzle of our time. Specifically, we must invent a new and as yet unimagined way of speaking andthinking about global annihilation that cannot be ignored, devalued, debated, coopted, subverted,exaggerated, or denied. Here is a distinctly cultural task that demands our sweat, dedication,cooperation, and urgent attention. 
The nature of the task before us is immense. The tools with which we must work include oursystems of logic, our conceptual categories, our social practices. These tools are not only inadequate,they are also part — if not parcel — of the problem we must solve. Our current techniques for“making sense” of things allow us to transform the immediacy of nuclear annihilation and to talkabout it in many other terms, including: prayers, treaties, jokes, songs, portentous statements, andso on. This tranformational ability is indeed useful in many social instances, but in the case ofdestructive nuclear devices it permits us to easily — I think too easily — distance ourselves fromthe lethal reality we inhabit daily, moment to moment. These transformations — and the factors thatmake them possible — are the central issue in Goffman’s Frame Analysis. My purpose in the nextseveral pages is to illustrate clearly that our cultural practices permit us too easily to escape — orat least distance ourselves — from the finality of our lethal reality. We need new frames in whichsuch irresponsible escape is not possible. Recognizing this social need, however, is predicated onan understanding of our old frames and why they fail us. Goffman, when writing Frame Analysis,frequently resorted to published anecdotes, newspaper stories, and artifacts from popular culture toillustrate his major points. I have followed his methodological example in writing this paper. InGoffman’s words, let us now sneak in and watch the way we snore. 
PART II: THE PRIMARY FRAMEWORKS 
Goffman systematically outlined the ways in which we “make sense of” events in our world.Relevance to the issue at hand is direct: How do we go about “making sense of” our nuclear reality?How do we “make sense of” the socio-physical fact that sufficient destructive force to destroy alllife ten times over (a conservative estimate) stands “ready to go at a moment’s notice”? TheGoffmanian answer is that we interpret everyday events in terms of two primary frameworks: (1)natural laws, such as those found in physics, chemistry, and biology which “identify occurrencesseen as undirected, unoriented, unanimated, unguided, ‘purely physical’” and (2) guided doingswhich “incorporate the will, aim, and controlling effect of a live agency,” usually understood ashuman (Goffman, 1974: 22). 
Thus, the falling of an apple to the ground is explained or “made sense of” by reference tothe local laws of gravity. On the other hand, a young person throwing an apple through Dr.Newton’s window in the physics building illustrates a guided doing. This example, apples thrownthrough windows, highlights a special feature about “guided doings.” They involve the simultaneouscoordination of human intent, bodily action, and the utilization of natural laws. Thus, spiking applesthrough a window — to be a guided doing — requires intent to throw, plus the bodily coordinationto properly fire the missile such that it goes where intended. This last part requires at least anexperiential understanding of the physics of trajectory. In addition, “guided doings” are alwayssubject to failure, that is, there is always the real possibility that our young thrower will miss Dr.Newton’s window altogether. Shortly, I will note the circumstances which account for guided doingswhich go “haywire” when they shouldn’t — as well as those which succeed in the face of seeminglyimpossible odds. 
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First, however, let me be quite clear about the way Goffman’s basic scheme applies tonuclear weapons. Consider a nuclear detonation in its purely physical aspects. This event can beexplained or “made sense of” by making reference to natural laws, specifically the laws of physics.The origin of the energy released by nuclear devices is contained in Einstein’s famous and compactequation: 
E= mc 
where m is mass and c is the speed of light (Craig and Jungerman, 1986: 112). More dramatic andless terse was President Harry Truman’s characterization of atomic energy during his announcementof the first military use of nuclear fission: 
It is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the Universe.The force from which the sun draws its powers. . . . (New York Times, 8-7-45: 8). 
Now, consider the dropping of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. This was,in no uncertain terms, a complex and coordinated example of a “guided doing.” The followingstatement, made by the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, on August 7, 1945, underscores this point: 
The recent use of the atomic bomb on Japan, which was today made knownby the President, is the culmination of years of herculean effort on the part of scienceand industry working in cooperation with the military authorities. (New York Times,8-7-45: 8). 
The available documentary record includes the specific order instructing the United States’military to drop the bomb. The order said, in part: 
1. The 309 Composit Group, 20th Air Force will deliver its first special bombas soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945. . . .(Source: Documentary in Japanese (untranslated) on the Hiroshima bombing,University of Michigan library). 
Through reference to such documentary evidence, an unequivocal case is made that the nucleardestruction of two Japanese cities by the United States was a guided doing. 
The obliteration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the delivery and detonation of nuclearweapons is “made sense of” by reference to Goffman’s two primary frameworks: natural laws andguided doings. In our culture, there is nothing mysterious here, nothing beyond our grasp ofunderstanding — and this I argue should be (but isn’t) seen as deeply problematic on amicrofoundational level. We may have great moral anguish and questions about the military use ofnuclear weapons, but these do not negate the fact that someone did order the pilot and crew of theEnola Gay on a destructive mission of unprecedented dimensions. We may not approve of the actiontaken, but we understand it as a guided doing. Was the bombing of Japan a “sin”? Was it the act ofan insane person to give such an order and for others to obey it? Perhaps — but insanity and sin canbe made sense of — can be understood in our culture — by reference to natural laws and guideddoings. The point is this: the comprehensive facticity of Hiroshima and Nagasaki do not escape ourbasic, fundamental ways of explaining our world to ourselves. To summarize at this point, I haveidentified Goffman’s two primary frameworks and have demonstrated that the U.S. initiation ofintentionally destructive nuclear detonations fits well within these frameworks. That is to say, wehave no other culturally-sustained accounting of these events, such as magic, the whims of angrygods, or extra-terrestrial intervention, for example. 
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PART III: BRIDGE EXPLANATIONS 
Here, I will try to illuminate the built-in potential for both failure as well as exceptionalperformance in guided doings. For example, first suppose the crew members of the Enola Gay hadgot their bearings wrong, made a mistake, and detonated an atomic bomb over Honolulu instead ofHiroshima. Alternatively, suppose the crew of the Enola Gay had faced turbulent weather andJapanese anti-aircraft fire over Hiroshima so heavy as to virtually guarantee an aborted mission andyet somehow managed to drop a bomb on the intended target. How could these hypotheticalpossibilities, if realized, be explained? In the first case, Goffman refers to “muffings” and in thesecond he refers to “stunts.” These (and two additional categories of explanation noted below) arethe major “bridge explanations” in Goffman’s scheme. By this term, I mean that these are formulaswe use to “make sense of” events that do not fall easily into the two primary frameworks. Theseways to account for things help to keep the epistemological foundations of our everyday world intact— and, I submit, vulnerable to future nuclear devastation.
III. A. Muffings 
A “muffing” occurs when the control normally expected in a guided doing is absent or istemporarily lost. Hence, when persons normally able to walk up a flight of stairs without fallingdown do in fact lose their footing and fall down, one can speak of a muffing. At the micro level,muffings allow us to forgive interpersoanl faux pas, goofs, and slips. As linguistic ploys, they areextraordinarily useful, allowing us time and again to recover our social footing. 
On the other hand, one can easily understand that muffings where nuclear weapons areconcerned are potentially consequential in the extreme. The “relatively minor” nuclearcontamination catastrophes at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl give pause for reflection on thesocio-global significance of nuclear muffings. Indeed, President Truman, in his announcement onAugust 6, 1945, emphasized the safety of the bomb manufacturing process. And well he shouldhave, because the question readily comes to mind: If a bomb can destroy cities in Japan, whathappens if one goes off “by accident” in the U.S.? Truman put it this way: 
Although the workers at the sites [in the U.S.] have been making materialsto be used in producing the greatest destructive force in history they have notthemselves been in danger beyond that of many other occupations, for the utmostcare has been taken for their safety. (New York Times, 8-7-45: 8)
Such is the stuff of Presidential assurances. 
Accounts of nuclear events since 1945 have often made recourse to “muffings” as a categoryof explanation. For example, the New York Times reported the following as part of a story aboutmuffings involving nuclear weapons: 
The Pentagon yesterday released details on 32 nuclear accidents that killedat least 56 persons in the last 30 years. . . . Nuclear weapons and material were lostin several of the cases. (New York Times, 5-17-81: 17) 
The point here is not so much that nuclear bomb accidents do happen, but that we have availablesuch linguistic categories as “accident,” “mistake,” “carelessness,” and “muffing” and that we doapply them in situations where persons have failed to exhibit “appropriate control” during theperformance of “guided doings” involving nuclear weapons. We do not see the application of these
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categories as reprehensible or dangerous. Quite the opposite, we appear culturally programmed toreadily accept their use. 
Commentators on our nuclear age have already worried that World War III could be started“by accident.” Military officials rush to note, however, that the estimated statistical probability ofsuch an accident is extremely small. C. Wright Mills (1960) found such assurances less thancomforting, observing that given enough time an event with a low probability of occurrencebecomes a virtual certainty in the long run. Seen in this light — and considering the irreversiblecharacter of mutually assured wholesale nuclear destruction — the category “muffing” isunforgiving, not subject to remedy, lacking any opportunity of “doing better next time.” 
III. B. Stunts 
In contrast to muffings, doing a “stunt” displays remarkable control where none is expected.Goffman (1974: 30) defines a stunt as: 
The maintenace of guidance and control by some willed agency under whatare seen as nearly impossible conditions. 
The A-bomb mission flown to Hiroshima was by no means a stunt. It was carefully plannedand rehearsed. The military mind does not like stunts and no doubt actively discourages them inconjunction with nuclear weapons. Indeed, the government bureaucracy applies strict controls onaccess to and possession of weapons-grade nuclear materials as well as to information on how toconstruct and detonate nuclear devices. These tight security measures, however, create the “nearlyimpossible conditions” that not only tempt the prankster, but also make successful espionage afinancially and politically lucrative activity. 
It is worth considering that the “impossible odds” may be media constructions and officialpropaganda rather than actual reality. The high odds against stealing nuclear secrets and materialsare a central feature in fictional accounts of the James Bond variety. The protagonists in such storiesrequire super-human resolve, technological sophistication and gadgetry, and uncommon athleticprowess in to carry off the enemy’s nuclear secrets. Real life spies, however, are typically mundaneand — when aided by the “muffings” and oversights of others — find that the actual theft of nuclearsecrets is much easier than many of us would suspect. 
A recently reported theft of both secrets and bomb-grade uranium was attributed to a maninvolved in such an array of prior criminal acts that one suspects a serious muffing in his beingapproved for a Top Secret security clearance. The Detroit News reports: 
Washington — A nuclear facility technician with a top security clearance isaccused of selling classified documents and uranium to the Palestine LiberationOrganization (PLO) as well as being involved in rape, arson, robbery, illegal drugs,and impersonating a police officer, a government report said Thursday. . . . The GAOreport said the technician suspected of committing the series of crimes got an intialsecurity clearance in 1974 and answered security questionnaires in 1978 and 1984but that no derogatory information was uncovered until a deputy sheriff told theEnergy Department about the employee’s arrest for carrying a weapon and havingan expired license plate. (Detroit News, 4-10-87: 7A). 
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Such accounts give one pause to wonder why nuclear-based stunts are not, in fact, much morecommon. Perhaps they are. The proverbial barn door appears left open on too many occasions. If“high risk” espionage is executed by agents sufficiently astute to keep their car registrations current,their exploits may well go undetected — and unappreciated by the general public. 
In some ways more stunning than the exploits of nuclear spies is the documented work ofJ.A. Phillips, an undergraduate physics student who “beat the odds” by successfully designing anatomic bomb as a class project. His autobiographical account, titled: Mushroom: The Story of the
A-Bomb Kid (Phillips and Aristotle, 1978), is fascinating reading. Phillips’ design resulted bycombining his basic physics training with information in unclassified documents readily availablefor purchase from the U.S. National Technical Information Service. 
Rank amateurs can also “beat the odds.” Howard Morland (1979), a reporter for The
Progressive magazine, wrote an article detailing the basic principles of the H-bomb. He based hisresearch on declassified government documents. Morland was apparently close enough to “thesecret” that the U.S. government strenuously attempted to have the article suppressed. 
Presumably the actual construction of an A-bomb is not difficult if the required materials canbe obtained. Mechanix Illustrated (yes, really!) reported the following in an article titled: “AHomebuilt Atomic Bomb?”: 
How do you make an A-bomb? Any number of ways. One is to take twometal salad bowls, line them with wax, fill with plutonium and solder them togetherto form a sphere. Then wrap them with plastic explosives and detonate, making surethe exposive material goes off evenly all around the sphere. (Mechanix Illustrated,1977: 158). 
The example above may exaggerate the ease of constructing nuclear devices, but the difficulty ofnuclear “stunts” may also be overrated. Craig and Jungerman (1986: 381) conclude that: 
A team of skilled terrorists could probably produce a low-yield weapon.Nuclear weapons are small, and a terrorist organization could probably place one inany major city, with little danger of being caught.
The reality of nuclear stunts is at hand. They appear for the moment limited to local rather thanglobal productions. They may still be relatively difficult but we know now that they are notimpossible. 
III. C. Astounding Complexes 
The previous examples lead to a third bridge explanation explicated by Goffman. At issuehere are those few times when something really does seem impossible, when we encountersomething that we just cannot account for reasonably in terms of natural law, guided doings,muffings, or stunts. Goffman calls a situation of this character an “astounding complex.” In practice,Goffman (1974: 28) notes, we approach an astounding complex with a sort of intellectual holdingaction. That is, we “expect that a ‘simple’ or ‘natural’ explanation will soon be discovered.” 
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Goffman (1974: 30) argues, and it is a central point in his analysis, that: 
In our society, the very significant assumption is generally made that allevents — without exception — can be contained and managed within theconventional system of belief. We tolerate the unexplained but not the inexplicable. 
When no explanation is at hand, when we encounter an astounding complex, we rest comfortablyand confidently that explanations in terms of the two primary frameworks, natural laws and/orguided doings, will soon arrive. 
When the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, many Japanese reacted to this eventas an “astounding complex.” The destruction of Hiroshima was too great and too quick to beaccounted for by the officials of the Japanese Government in terms of their knowledge of themilitary capabilities of the United States. Indeed, a temporary problem faced by the U.S.Government after the first atomic bombing was to convince the Japanese Government that thedevastation was neither fluke nor accident. 
A central function of the news media in our era is to supply explanations — when available— and to assure us that “the details” will follow on the 11:00 p.m. news when no explanations areimmediately at hand. For example, following the destruction of Hiroshima: 
The [U.S.] Office of War Information began telling the Japanese today whathit them. OWI branch transmitters in San Francisco, Hawaii and Saipan beamedPresident Truman’s statement on the atomic bomb to Japan. (New York Times,8-7-45: 1). 
The U.S. Government wanted no doubt about its part in the bombing. It wanted the JapaneseGovernment to understand clearly that the bombing was a devastating “guided doing” that could berepeated many times over. 
III. D. Fortuitousness 
Unexplained events can also be accounted for in our culture as “fortuitous,” as when acompetently performing person: 
. . . meets with the natural workings of the world in a way he could not beexpected to anticipate, with consequential results. Or two or more unconnected andmutually unoriented individuals, each properly guiding his own doings, jointly bringabout an unanticipated event that is significant. (Goffman, 1974: 33). 
Thus, as a simple matter of fortuitousness, many citizens of Hiroshima found themselves “out oftown” on business or other errands on August 6, 1945, while Japanese from other cities made tripsto the doomed city with no thought to what the day would bring. The classic French film, Hiroshima
— Mon amour, invokes precisely this appeal to fortuitous timing in a conversation between twolovers, one of whom lived in Hiroshima and recounts how he escaped the bombing just by “luck.”Survivors’ accounts from Hiroshima and Nagasaki tell of persons who walked away from infernosand collapsing buildings without a scratch while friends standing next to them were instantlyincinerated. We explain such events as happenstance, fortuitous, “as luck would have it,” but — andthis is the important part — without recourse to any forces or powers beyond natural law and/orguided doings. 
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III. E. Summary 
Goffman asserts that our epistemological schema is fundamentally simple andcomprehensive. All events, even the most diabolically lethal, are “made sense of” or accounted forin terms of natural laws and/or guided doings — these are the two primary frameworks. Any eventsthat strain our ability to apply these two frameworks in a direct and unvarnished fashion are easilyand quickly accounted for by one of the available bridging explanations which hold our everydayepistemological world together. These include: muffings, stunts, astounding complexes, andfortuitousness. 
I trust that the foregoing discussion and examples have made it clear that Goffman’smicrofoundational categories are not merely hypothetical. That is, where destructive nuclear devicesare concerned, these categories — these ways of making sense — are used in our culture. It isimportant — and sobering — to recognize that nuclear weapons and nuclear warfare have not beenaccorded extra-epistemological status outside Goffman’s two primary frameworks. That is to say,we “make sense of” nuclear warfare in our culture in the very same way that we make sense ofeverything we encounter in everyday life, from cornflakes to circus clowns to murder and mischief.Nuclear warfare and the threat of nuclear annihilation, despite the unprecedented, industrializedcapacity for instantaneous mass violence (Giddens, 1985), do not receive special conceptualtreatment in our culture. I submit that this micro-level, business-as-usual approach to nuclearannihilation is a serious, macro-level socio-cultural threat. 
PART IV: KEYS 
Before I leave the above hypothesis in final form, however, there is more to glean fromGoffman. Insights derived from his work underscore the extreme lengths which we have alreadytraveled in this culture to incorporate nuclear war within the bounds of our epistemologicalframeworks. The elasticity of our frameworks is amazing and impressive — and in the past this hasserved us well by giving rise to a nearly inexhaustible stream of transformation and invention. Yet,is it possible that we are reaching our cultural limit? Have we socially constructed a situation inwhich it no longer makes sense to stretch our conceptual categories to cover a phenomenon whichin the final analysis will blow us — and our categories —  to oblivion? Before we engage an answer,however, let me review the basic ways in which we transform events of one kind into events ofanother kind. To conduct this inventory efficiently, I invoke the Goffmanian concept of “keys.” 
According to Goffman, keys are identifiable sets of conventions or rules by which an activityalready “made sense of” in terms of the two primary frameworks is transformed into somethingpatterned on this activity but that is clearly understood by all concerned to be something quitedifferent. For example, suppose we observe an atmospheric or above ground detonation of a nuclearweapon. We interpret this event initially in terms of guided doings and the laws of physics. Now,however, suppose we watch an episode of the television show Battlestar Gallactica in which large,global arsenals of nuclear weapons are detonated. Indeed, just such a display was offered asentertainment during a recent re-run of the Gallactica episodes. The make-believe images on thetelevision screen are a “key” on actual nuclear detonations. The images on Battlestar Gallacticawere been produced according to a set of “special-effects” conventions, conventions we accept astelevision viewers. In the same way, we discriminate between a “real” fight and persons who areonly “playing” at fighting. Play is a key, a set of rules, by which any serious activity can betransformed into something less serious, perhaps even funny. 
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Goffman identifies several keys or transformations common to our culture. The generalcategories of keys include: make believe, contests, ceremonies, and technical redoings. Not alltransformations are straightforward keys, however. “Fabrications” are additional transformationsin which persons are deliberately deceived about the actual seriousness of events in which they areengaged. Much government propaganda falls into the category of “fabrication.” Deception isfundamentally involved in attempts to establish verification rules by which one nuclear power canmonitor the nuclear capabilities of another without being duped as to the real state of affairs.Important as these issues are, they are delayed here for treatment in a subsequent analysis. Therelevant point here is that anything that can be keyed can also be faked, and vice versa, apparentlyad infinitum. The following review focuses specifically on keys alone and illustrates that we have,in our everyday world, performed every major key upon the serious reality of nuclear destruction.Keep in mind what this implies. It means that we have taken the reality and global horror of nucleardeath and — through the use of keys — transformed it into many other things which are not lethaland which may even be thought of as “fun” or entertainment. 
My intent here is not to be exhaustive within each category or subcategory of any specifickey, but I do intend to be comprehensive in showing that each of the keys Goffman identifies (aswell as some he does not) are used in our culture to transform the reality of nuclear weapons intosomething different, often something less than real, something fictional, even playful. The majorpossibilities, with examples, are outlined below.
IV. A. Make-Believe 
By the term “make-believe,” Goffman (1974: 48) refers to the immitation or running throughof the activity that is keyed “with the knowledge that nothing practical will come of the doing.”Specific subcategories include the following: 
IV. A. 1. Play and Playfulness 
By “play,” Goffman (1974: 48) refers to “relatively brief intrusions of unserious mimicry.”In the following example of atomic play, however, things did get a bit out of hand: 
Four children were injured yesterday afternoon when chemicals with whichthey were playing at making atom bombs exploded [in a Brooklyn apartment]. (New
York Times, 12-3-45: 12). 
IV. A. 2. Daydreams and Private Fantasy 
The extent to which members of our society daydream about nuclear war and/or nuclearweapons is unknown, but psychologists remind us that a significant number of youngsters do at least“think about” the possibility of nuclear war. From my own experience as a nuclear weapons guardin the U.S. Air Force, I can relate that I found myself more than once constructing mental “What if.....?” scenarios involving an atomic missile launch. We know that many people while asleep havedreams and nightmares about nuclear attacks, but these are not discussed here since Goffmananalyzes dreams as fabrications rather than keys. 
The cerebral musings that philosophers and other thinkers leave to us in memoirs and diaryscan be conceptualized as the written aftermath of daydreams and private fantasy. Consider the
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following entry in the diary left by Thomas Merton (1965: 249) and recorded at the time of theCuban missile crisis: 
I am only just beginning to realize that we were very close indeed to nuclearwar; never so close! The very undignified way Kruschev backed down makes thisvery clear indeed. The bombers were all ready to go, and he had no doubts on thatscore. Thank God it is over.
Thus, Merton provided a written trace of his private, presumably unscripted thoughts. 
IV. A. 3. Dramatic Scriptings 
The example above, in its written form, introduces scripts intended to unfold publicly as astory. Goffman (1974: 53) included here the wide range of productions offered “to the publicthrough the media of television, radio, newspapers, magazines, books, theater.” He viewed dramaticscriptings as especially significant because: 
. . . they provide a mock-up of everyday life, a put together script ofunscripted social doings, and thus are a source of broad hints concerning thestructure of [unscripted guided doings]. (Goffman, 1974: 53). 
Specific sub-categories noted by Goffman include the following (to which I have added a fewadditional conventional formulas not treated by Goffman, including: television dramas, poems,popular music, proper names, slogans, and jokes): 
IV. A. 3. a. Novels 
Novels are a paradigm example of scripted nuclear keyings to the extent that they areimaginary stories based on the actuality of potential nuclear destruction. Examples include: 
(1) Eugene Burdick and Harvey Wheeler’s classic, Fail Safe. 
(2) N.J. Crisp’s recent thriller, The Brink. 
(3) Peter George’s Dr. Strangelove, or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb. 
(4) Jeff Sutton’s H-Bomb over America. This book is described on its book jacket as “anovel of the five most harrowing days and nights ever faced by any nation.” 
(5) John Gardner’s The Last Trump. From the book jacket, we learn that this is a book about“The free world’s last chance: Golgotha — a top secret missile installation that canonly be activated with bits of information stored in the subconscious minds of sleeperagents.” Such is the stuff of James Bond! 
IV. A. 3. b. Television Dramas 
Recent offerings on television that key nuclear detonation tend toward the sober side ratherthan the Ramboid adventurism of the above listed novels. Examples include: 
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(1) Home, a PBS production, explores the moral dilemma faced by two Air Force officersat an underground launch control facility who receive an order to launch theirminuteman missiles at targets in the USSR. It turns out that the launch order is anerror, and the officer who resists the launch becomes thereby a hero. 
(2) The Day After, a commercial venture, was very successful in U.S. television ratings, apoint noted with pride in the trade journal Advertising Age. 
(3) Threads, a production of the BBC, is also a drama in the realist genre. 
(4) With an attempt at humor, the 1986-87 season run of Sledge Hammer ended when thegung-ho police detective “muffs” his attempt to disarm a nuclear warhead, causingan atomic holocaust. 
IV. A. 3. c. Legitimate Theater 
Numerous stage plays key nuclear themes. Examples include: 
(1) But with a Whimper, by Pat Revor, concerns an English couple who survive a nuclearholocaust and speculate on how it occured while they try to maintain hope. 
(2) Meet Noah Smith, by G.L. Bennett, adapts the biblical story of Noah to modern timeswhere nuclear fallout contaminates the earth and a bomb shelter replaces the ark. 
(3) Ground Zero, by Brian Shein, is a satire on nuclear war. 
Many additional stage plays are found easily by consulting the Play Index under the “subjectheading” (yet another key!) of “Nuclear war.” 
IV. A. 3. d. Motion Pictures 
The list here is substantial. Two filmographies cataloging the available nuclear movies werealready compiled a decade ago (Dowling, 1977; Shaheen, 1978). Classic film examples include: 
(1) The Mouse That Roared, in which the Grand Duchy of Fenwick declares war on theUnited States so Fenwick can lose and thereby collect foreign aid from the U.S.Through happenstance, however, Fenwick steals a U.S. doomsday bomb capable ofdestroying the entire planet and thus wins its war by holding the nuclear nations“hostage.” 
(2) Dr. Strangelove, in which an Air Force Officer utilizes his knowledge of SIOP plans topurposely launch a nuclear attack on the USSR. 
(3) Hiroshima — Mon amour, in which a Japanese man who survived the bombing ofHiroshima as a matter of fortuitousness falls in love with a French woman who, inher own way, survived the ravages of World War II in Europe and has come to Japanas an actress to make a peace film about Hiroshima. 
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(4) War Games, in which a teenage hacker penetrates the Pentagon’s most sophisticatedcomputer network and almost starts a global nuclear exchange “by accident.” 
IV. A. 3. e. Poetry 
Poets have turned their pens to virtually everything, including nuclear destruction. Severalexamples are found in The Oxford Book of War Poetry; Of Quarks, Quasars, and other Quirks — 
Quizzical Poems for the Supersonic Age; Breaking Silence — An Anthology of Contemporary Asian
American Poets; and other available anthologies. Specific poems are easily located by consultingGranger’s Index to poetry under the subject headings “atomic” and “nuclear.” I produce here theentire text of a poem from the Oxford Book of 20th Century English Verse (pp. 585-86) that keysa nuclear attack: 
Your Attention Please by Peter Porter 
The Polar DEW has just warned that A nuclear rocket strike of At least one thousand megatons Has been launched by the enemy Directly at our major cities. This announcement will take Two and a quarter minutes to make, You therefore have a further Eight and a quarter minutes To comply with the shelter Requirements published in the Civil Defence Code—section Atomic Attack. A specially shortened Mass Will be broadcast at the end Of this announcement— Protestant and Jewish services Will begin simultaneously— Select your wavelength immediately According to instructions In the Defence Code. Do not Take well-loved pets (including birds) Into your shelter—they will consume Fresh air. Leave the old and bed- ridden, you can do nothing for them. Remember to press the sealing Switch when everyone is in The shelter. Set the radiation Aerial, turn on the geiger barometer. Turn off your Television now. Turn off your radio immediately The Services end. At the same time Secure explosion plugs in the ears Of each member of your family. Take Down your plasma flasks. Give your children 
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The pills marked one and two In the C.D. green container, then put Them to bed. Do not break The inside airlock seals until The radiation All Clear shows (Watch for the cuckoo in your perspex panel), or your District Touring Doctor rings your bell. If before this, your air becomes Exhausted or if any of your family Is critically injured, administer The capsules marked ‘Valley Forge’ (Red pocket in No. I Survival Kit) For painless death. (Catholics Will have been instructed by their priests What to do in this eventuality.) This announcement is ending. Our President Has already given orders for Massive retaliation—it will be Decisive. Some of us may die. Remember, statistically It is not likely to be you. All flags are flying fully dressed On Government buildings—the sun is shining. Death is the least we have to fear. We are all in the hands of God, Whatever happens happens by His Will. Now go quickly to your shelters. 
IV. A. 3. f. Popular Music 
An interesting point about keys and keying on the eve of destruction is that no key gets amonopoly on nuclear devastation. The serious poet and playwright are not unique in their gloom ortheir satire. For example, Peter Tosh’s new recording, No Nuclear War, was deemed “best reggaealbum” among the 1988 awards of the recording industry. The lyrics from two popular, mass marketmusic albums are included here to illustrate the practice of keying nuclear annihilation in allquarters. The first lyrics key the potential for propaganda in a nuclear era while the second set is theepitome of understatement, suggesting that after a nuclear attack “it’s never gonna be the same.” 
Man at C & A by The Specials 
Warnin’ warnin’ nuclear attack Atomic sources designed to blow your mind World War III Nuclear nuclear attackRocking atomically in this third world war Atomic sounds The man in black he told me the lastest Moscow news about the storm across the Red Sea 
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They drove their ballpoint views I’m the man in grey, I’m just the man at C & A And I don’t have a say in the wargames that they play Warnin’ warnin’ nuclear attack Shock attack to hit you in the back World War III The Mickey Mouse bunch told the Ayatollah at his feet You’ll drink your oil you schmuck, we’ll eat our heads of wheat But I’m the man in grey, I’m just the man at C & A And I don’t have a say in the wargames that they play Don’t chuck another bomb Nuclear nuclear nuclear war Warnin’ warnin’ nuclear attack The bomb will never fall Shock attack. 
Rendez-Vous with Radiation by Rob Bolland 
Bombs exploding, silver shadows in the night Plans unfolding, telling me we’re gonna die Vision’s fading, buring fires in the night Should have stayed in, it’s not safe to be outside Rendez-vous with radiation Rendez-vous with radiation I know that it’s never gonna be the same Watch the fallout, got to save ourselves somehow Soldiers call out, nothing here can save us now Rendez-vous with radiation Rendez-vous with radiation I now that it’s never gonna be the same. 
IV. A. 3. g. Names 
The nuclear era brings opportunities to key the A-bomb in terms of one’s commercialbusiness operations. That this should happen in a capitalist society is perhaps not unexpected.Consider the following white pages business listings in the Chicago telephone directory: 
ATOMIC AUTO RECYCLING INC 
ATOMIC DRAINAGE SERVICE 
ATOMIC ELECTRONICS 
ATOMIC ENGINEERING CO 
ATOMIC SUBMARINE 
ATOMIC TELEVISION SERVICE 
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IV. A. 3. h. Slogans 
Ban the Bomb! 
No Nukes!
 IV. A. 3. i. Jokes and Cartoons 
“If You’ve Seen One Nuclear War You’ve Seen them All!”
The attached cartoons (Figures 1 and 2, below) attest that we are never above a bit of mirth,even when what is being keyed is grave, grim, and final.
IV. B. Contests
Can we have nuclear games, complete with rules for winning and losing? Of course. One canpurchase a board game titled Nuclear War.2 This transformation includes the built-in assumptionthat someone, presumably “our side,” can “win.” 
IV. C. Ceremonials 
Nuclear ceremonies take various forms.  When we take time to look, we see ritual dramasof many types unexpectedly embedded in and structuring our everyday lives (Deegan, forthcoming).The thrice daily loading of SIOP (Single Integrated Operation Plans plans on board SAC’scontinuously airborne secondary command posts has distinctive ritual traits grounded in centuriesof military pomp and circumstance.3  Other ceremonies are commemorative. Recently, thoseinvolved in the design of the first atomic bomb arranged an official reunion, complete with all theritual reminiscing that typifies reunions. The New York Times reported: 
Los Alamos, N.M. After 40 years, the memories of the men and womenmeeting here this weekend went back to little things. . . . A buildings managerremembered the impatience of a famous nuclear scientist whose quarters were toocold. It turned out that Edward Teller did not know how to turn up the thermostat.(New York Times, 6-17-85: 12). 
2 Seen for sale in the window of a hobby shop in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
3 Regularly witnessed during my tour of duty in the Strategic Air Command at Offutt AirForce Base.
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Formal religious services were recently performed on the exact site of the first atomicexplosion (the “Trinity Test”) complete with an alter steeped in nuclear symbolism: 
Rev. Layton Zimmer of St. Adrian’s Episcopal Church in Albuquerque . . .celebrated the Eucharist at an alter bearing earth from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. (New
York Times, 7-17-85: 14). 
A particularly somber series of ceremonies are the annual reunions, peace marches, andvigils of the Hibakusha, or “survivors,” of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These ceremonial marches anddemonstrations were documented recently in a PBS special titled: Remembering the Bomb.Specifically artistic celebration is also possible. A recent article in Print titled “Celebrating Survival”tells how: 
The 40th anniversary of the atomic disaster at Hiroshima is commemoratedby 125 U.S. designers and illustrators, Joining with their Japanese colleagues tocreate posters as a gift to the city [of Hiroshima]. 
IV. D. Technical Redoings 
Technical redoings involve performing an activity out of its usual context with theunderstanding that the original outcome of the activity will not occur, yet unlike play the redoingis for a utilitarian purpose. Sub-categories include the following: 
IV. D. 1. Practicing 
IV. D. 1. a. Simulations 
Since the atmospheric test ban, all United States nuclear tests have beencarried out underground at a test site in Nevada . . . . But underground tests are oflimited utility in gauging the actual effects of nuclear weapons on housing andmilitary facilities, so simulated tests are carried out from time to time using chemicalexplosives. (New York Times, 6-28-1985: 10). 
IV. D. 1. b. Rehearsals 
Consider this news story on practice runs flown by B-52 bombers in the U.S. The accountbegan: 
To train for a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union, the B-52 bomberthundered down the icy runway and lifted off over the North Dakota prairie just asdawn broke. (New York Times, 12-2-55,II: 11). 
A central feature of nuclear wargames is that these practice runs can mimic but never achieve “real”conditions. As Goffman (1974: 65) put it: 
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This dilemma is seen most clearly perhaps in war games, where participantsmust take seriously that which can ultimately be made serious only by what can’t beemployed: “live” ammunition lethally directed. 
IV. D. 1. c. Planning 
Attentive readers of newspapers need few reminders that the U.S. Department of Defenseis continually reviewing and revising its plans for future nuclear devastation. Budget approval forever more sophisticated deployment and delivery systems, if temporarily slowed from time to time,has become routine. Recent history clearly documents the planning and acquisition of theB1-bomber, MIRVs, Long-wave radio transmitters, the neutron bomb, and now, the so-calledStrategic Defense Initiative (whose lasers, paradoxically, are powered by H-bomb detonations). 
IV. D. 2. Demonstrations 
Demonstrations or tests of actual nuclear devices have a long and continuing history. Anuclear test is a redoing because although a real nuclear weapon is detonated, it is not intended tohave lethal consequences. The fallout from atmospheric tests does have long-range healthimplications even if the test site per se has been fully evacuated. Thus, such tests have beensuspended by nuclear powers. Hence, the use of chemical simulations of above ground tests and thepresent use of below ground tests which are assumed not to have the potentially lethal consequencesof above ground tests. 
IV. D. 3. Replays 
Recent developments in photographic and electronic technology have vastly increased ourcapacity to document and then review our actions on film and video. 
IV. D. 3. a. Documentation 
The documentary format includes news reports, microfilm, histories, photo essays,illustrations, news film archives, interviews, documentary films, and so on. Several PBSdocumentaries during the past few years have focused on the development of nuclear devices, theirtesting, use, and present deployment. 
I recently received a catalog of “Documentary Photo Aids” to use in classroom teaching. Forthe price of $42.00, one can obtain a set of 40 “photo aids” that depict “The First Nuclear War.” Thetext in the catalog states that: 
The pictures take you into Hiroshima and Nagasaki minutes after the atomicexplosions to show the appalling devastation. The set asks difficult questions aboutour rationale for being the first to use the atomic bomb.
A companion set of 18 photos, titled “Development of the Atomic Bomb,” is available for $17.00. 
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IV. D. 3. b. Exhibits 
Museums in Japan and the United States enshrine the history of the nuclear age. The U.S.National Atomic Museum is located at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico. Facilities include: 
Library of books on the history of nuclear weapons available on premises;devices, models and actual weapons explaining atomic structure and the use ofnuclear energy in war and peace. (Source: American Museum Directory). 
Bring the kids, no charge! 
IV. D. 4. Group Psychotherapy and Role-Playing 
I didn’t really expect to find a solid example of psycho- nuclear role play, but a recent bookby William and Mary Van Ornum titled Talking to Children About Nuclear War rounds out thiscollection of Goffmanian keys. Here is just one of many “sample dialogs” for parents to study. Thereader is asked, “What do you think will be the result of the following conversations?” 
Dialog C. It’s 9:30 p.m., and the fire siren in a small Midwestern town goesoff. Josh, who is six years old, looks at his mother worriedly. Josh: Mom, do youthink that could be the Bomb? Mother: It sounds like the fire siren honey. It’s a scarythought, isn’t it? It seems a lot of people have been thinking about that lately. It’salways in the news. What do you know about it honey? Do your friends talk aboutit? Are you worried? 
IV. D. 5. Experiments 
Experiments are structurally similar to demonstrations and tests, although there is thepresumption that something new will be learned in an experiment whereas nuclear tests anddemonstrations may be partially or wholly motivated as a “show of force” rather than a scientificinquiry. If people are duped into being subjects of an experiment without their informed consent,Goffman speaks of their being contained in a category of fabrication, but full analysis of thiscategory lies beyond the scope of this paper (for discussion of the social meaning of fabrications andlies, see Goffman, 1974: 83-122, 156-200, 378-495; and Bok, 1978). Early nuclear detonations weredressed in experimental garb because the specific effects of nuclear blasts were unknown. Nuclearexperiments continue to dominate the news since underground detonations of H-bombs areconsidered essential by the U.S. Government for developing the lasers required for the proposedStrategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”) missile defense system. 
PART V: CONCLUSION 
This nuclear-based tour of Goffmanian keys has a purpose: to remind ourselves of theextreme flexibility and transformations permitted by our microfoundational rules for organizing oureveryday lives. They allow us in our everyday lives to key at will, to make jokes, movies, novels,experiments, slogans, museum displays, and so on and on, based upon keying the most deadly perilour world has ever faced. This flexibility is itself a threat. We ought to be wary when we key ortransform nuclear warfare in the same way that we key other socially important but far less seriousevents such as, for example, AIDS and teenage suicide (both of which have their full complement
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of jokes, songs, poetry, television dramas, talk show discussions, fund raisers, and self-help groups).We act on the nuclear threat in exactly the same way, writing letters to congresspersons, organizingtalk shows, fund raisers, television ads, newsletters, staging marches, demonstrations, and teach-ins.I noted in the introduction to this paper that such activities are not without merit, but their value doesnot lie primarily in their ability to end or reduce the nuclear threat. A telling comment to this pointwas heard on the weekly Midwestern television talk show called “Nuclear Issues.” The hostessinterviewed the organizer of a nuclear freeze protest march. The organizer, when pressed about theeffectiveness of the proposed march, replied that even if it didn’t help end the arms race, the marchitself would be fun. 
I have nothing against a good time or the generation of genuine communitas, these areimportant and fully legitimate human goals. At the same time, we must be careful not to confusethese keyed activities with serious actions actually designed to effectively terminate our presentcapacity for nuclear annihilation. In the same way, those of us with intellectual commitments to endthe nuclear threat must also be very careful not to confuse our standard academic practices with theserious, unprecedented microfoundational work now required to give our society the improved toolsit needs to come to grips with and solve our nuclear reality. 
We must search for and/or invent a new microfoundational frame in which to act on oursocially-constructed nuclear world. It has not helped to think about our nuclear dilemma as a naturalscience or engineering issue, a moral issue, a policy issue, or a military issue. I conclude that ourmacro nuclear dilemma is rooted fundamentally in a microfoundational flaw: the comprehensivetransformational nature of all available frames. We too easily and too often mistake our frames forreality. When we do stumble from time to time upon and recognize the sheer horror of our nuclearsituation, we diffuse it in a thousand ways through ready transformations. Transformational keysstrip what little understanding we do have of its capacity to generate effective action. Thus, weconcentrate our social energies on transformed realities rather than the main event. The questionstands before us: “Do we have the microfoundational equipment to understand and confront theradically new world that global nuclear destruction presents to us?” The present answer is negative. 
Consider the forms and formats we have already devised and used to discuss, debate, andpresumably understand the nuclear threat. We have essays, poems, novels, histories, analyses,symposiums, debates, interviews, documentaries, expert testimony, briefings, prayers, sermons,papal encyclicals, declarations, college courses, catalogs, inventories, surveys, censuses,questionnaires, hearings, referendums, marches, speeches, satire, protests, sit-ins, teach-ins, lettersto editors and congresspersons, news reports, memos, committees, agencies, commissions, lobbies,leaflets, ads, myths and parables, comic books, nightmares, glossaries, checklists, plans, exercises,investigations, exposes and, yes, papers such as this one. To what avail is all this work by thissociety’s cultural laborers? 
The future consequences of ineffectual activity are horrendous in our nuclear era. Thesituations we define as “helping” only serve to dissipate our intellectual resources and delay asolution. William and Dorothy Thomas (1928: 572) were correct to observe that, “If men definesituations as real, they are real in their consequences.” And Goffman (1974: 1) was even moreperceptive in recognizing that the Thomas’ famous dictum is: 
. . . true as it reads but false as it is taken. Defining situations as real certainlyhas consequences, but these may contribute very marginally to the events inprogress; in some cases only a slight embarrassment flits across the scene in mildconcern for those who tried to define the situation wrongly. All the world is not astage . . . . 
23
Neither is all the world a conference, symposium, or classroom. But few of us are embarrassed thatwe so often act on the opposite belief. Ineffectual activity, no matter how highly touted by itsproponents, has real consequences when the penalty for inaction is severe and final. All the whileour words flow and flower in key after key, the deployed nuclear arsenal grows ever more deadly. 
We presently live in a Goffmanian, tranformationally vulnerable nuclear world. The lengthof this epoch may be relatively short. This review suggests it is possible that our keys and our framesfor “making sense of” things are failing us now when we need them most. It is possible that ourmicrofoundational frameworks allow us to deceive ourselves at the very moment that we thinkourselves most rational and serious. Is Goffman now laughing at us as we snore away in the lasthours of the nuclear age? Our eventual wholesale extinction at the macro-level may well be rootedin exceedingly micro-level issues. At the same time, I very much hope that my thesis — that ourmicrofoundational cultural apparatus appears ill-equipped, if not unable, to conceptualize or framethe present nuclear threat in a way that lets us truly come to grips with it — is very much wrong. Ifthere is hope for our collective future, it requires nothing less than inventing entirely newframeworks of meaning for the micro-level organization of everyday life, ones in which the reality of nuclear devices and the very real threat of nuclear annihilation cannot be keyed into ineffectiveframes that become comfortable and less threatening. This is no small task, one that challenges usto think creatively beyond the apparently comprehensive microfoundational limits within which oureveryday world is now contained, constructed, and made meaningful.
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